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discourses, whether at a point in time 01 across till_1C, is a subject which we can
cohe.rently investigate in analyzing how people disagree ""ith ()ill-! (lJ1tltlLt:l'. Th.i~
topic is the chief theme of thi~ r:hapt.r:r. Second, prar:tically xp~aling, it seems
ilnperalive [rom a prugrcj:ijyc JX'litical point of view thM pOfItmori.cruist& learn
bow to defelld (JpellIH':~s, pluralism, ami lolerance in discourse against reactionary form!; of modernism. Doing thi~, Ilowevr:I', .lll'\iolvcs both showing' dearly
and reasonably persuasively how morl~rni~m c.an be morally .rmn politically
unhealthy for society; and also showing that there exists a handful of "essentials"
underlying the non-anar'chic play of competing di~L:Uurscl) iliat explain how a
posnnode:rn world is livable. This topic is a set:oIldary them.e of this chapter
touchcd upon in the last section belm¥.
1Iy position :might then be best put as holding that nihilism - or the view that
we can only record mOIlleuts of undecidability1 disorder:, and illdelerminacy - is
misguided, hut th8t what might altr:rnatively be termed principl"ll relalivism - as
will be set forth here - is meaningful and desirable. In wh;.jt follmv!'; T tty to investigate conditions that might fulfill and ciJaractL::l'l:';c a principled relativism, and
then turn to look critically Oil jJosunoderni"t njhi1i~m. In the [:m;t s-t'.clion, a.
clilemma IS first pos~rl filT postrIl(){l .. rnisl di~(;Ow'se analysis thal I sugg't:sL derives
from its past path of dcvdopmcnt :1..'\ a, R~t of ideas critical of morl~rni;;m. In the
second section, Olle mcal18 of addressing this dilemma is set out -in terms of a
discusslOlI or whaL I Lefm identity conditions for rnscour&:S. In the third section,
I tnrn In market exc.hange models used to ~lllc.i(lat.f: interaction ben'VeeTl
discourses to give a specifically economic application of the idea of identity
conditions for discourses, and then reexamine the original dilemma and its
suggested solulioll [rulIl chis new vantage point. In thl:: Lilla! section, I briefly
address the i;/":conoary th~me of the chapter, argl.l~ iTl favor llf principled relativism and against nihilism, and make a number of eonc111oing remarks about
poliLical- ethical issues that postrnout:I"uism rai::;es against modernism.

Pn.<;/:mflfkmi.mz fl1ld identity clJnditiol1s

strengths and wcakne.';ses relative Lo competing theories and lite philosophical
ideas that summa.rize ilielIl. Given thal philmophkal JebaL.. appt:an In h<lv~
all the characleristics of an l.mdecidahle exchange, it g~emg thar. S:lmll~lg is
correct in infen;ng that prescriptivist economic methodologies in the
Poppel'lall-LakaLosian lraJilioIl are rnisguiclcd in searehlllg for "the principles of
kUlrvvlt:(lgl. fJnilJlsilioTl which IWTmlt aCClJT<lJt' identification, description and
explanat.ioll of t'h~ ~'lbject" (p. (8).
A second, stronger claim Samuels makes is that "there is a hmdamcntal,
tautological relationship between the assumed principles of l.'lOwlcdgc acquisiLiolJ awllhe knowledge which is produced" (1" 68). Perhaps "tautological" is too
strong a tP.rm heTe, but it mllSt at least he close to the sense of Samuels' position,
which is also expressed in terms of an idea ,-vidcly accepted among postmodernists that one cannot ~~step out" of olle's O\\lll discow'st; Lhal is, l.here is
something inherendy contradictory about the idea that on~ might he of!ISJched
from the way ODe sees things. I think that there is a dilemma here that results
Ii'om 'C-OUjUllliug' lh~ second propusiLion lhal knowledge L-; ,c;omt"l1ow tied to it3
conditions of pl'(jductloll Lu Ule VroPUSi!.iOH in lbe previous paragraph Lhat (here
are no ullequivol~l rrJt:[a-disc()ur.~cs. This may Sl:(~HI oeId, SiflC~ on first glance
the tvlO propmitiom R~~m to he: mllt,lHl.lly ~llpporting. I.Cl: mc: then cxp<lnd llIxm
and reconstruct Samuels' case in an attempt to bring out what I believe to be the
clilernrna in question. In his view:

2

knowledge is tied to its conditions of production; and
there arc many distinct discourses on any given su~jcct (because the conditions of knowledge production are diverse).

From thi" it fo11o-w8 that:
~

A postrn.odernist non-conunumcation dile:nun.a.
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Ilu-;n-~ t:flTl h~ TlO lllliqll~ mt:'t;-J-di~cOl1r!:>e

on ;my sl.lbject.

But from this one might also plausibly inier that:

III Ule ·wllecLion of papers from the 1994 conference "Pluralism -in Economics:
The(lr)~

Hislory and Methodology" (Salanti and Screpallti 1996) in Dcrgarmo,

4

different discours es and their producers are non-communicating.

Tt<l.l)~ Warren Samuds argues - correctly in my VifW - r.hat alternative economic

methodologies each possess their «0\'Vll internal limitation and theTe is no single,
tUlequivocal~ condmive rnela-prin<.:ivk" upon which we can rely to choose
among those methodologiei; (SamlH~ls 19%: 67). That economic Hl(~lhodlJllJgi:-;ts
have in t.hf" past sought some "single, tUlequivoc::U J conclusive mefa-prin-r:iplr."
may lx: due to a. mistaken view of , . . hat the application of philosophical concepts
La economics can accomplislL A IIluuewisl "jew of the matter would have it that
philo..,>ophical ideas can provide firm) IHljlrohlrJIlaLic foundations for ecuIlUHlic
ones, and that philosophical ideas onc~ gra~p~c.I ar~ rdatively llncorrtn.lV~rsial
and convincing. A jJusunodcrnist 'view of the matter might have it that philosophical jdeas arc complex all.d problematical) and that ulcil' u~c js bette!' seen as
shm'lilalld reference to entire philosophical the(,l\"ie~, etch or wlii(:ll possess

This conclusion, however) surely po~es a dilemma for postmodernism and its
crilique of Hlmk:mism. OLl lhe 011C baml, if Ji[[eI'~nl Ji~eoun;es and their
pmdncf:rs arf: non-mmmlJn;cal'.ing, thf:n nn. on~ is in a. p(l!;itinn to confidently ~ay
that there is no single meta-discourse - and thm argue that th~ project of
modernigm is ml&conceived, In effect) undecidability across diJIcrcm discourses.
unuermiIlt::l uefense of the (s.hared) claim that. there :lli no single meta-discourse.
On [he ()l:h~T hand, if po~tmorl~Tnist~ ;Jgrt:'e that the modernist project is misconceived) then explicitly shared ground does seem to exist ben.veen discourses after
all. 'i'his both raises doubts about the postmodcrnt.sf. crilique uf cssc[Jlialj~l
modernism. and suggests tha.t knowledge production may not be that closely tied
to its conditions of production.
I
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T think thi~ dilem ma mote difficult to discharge than many pU~llllod cfl:USI.3
might suppose. In a se nse, it is one member of the class of the ancien t on r.-;\nd~hf': -m~.ny or nnity-n.nrl-pluralit:y paradoxt:l-1 that fIrst received eSIJet:ially de.ar
l;,xprt:"s~ion in CI)III1 ~()i(ln with Pla10'~ tl1F:ory of forms. Plato's problem was how
instances of things dissimilar and yet related to one another each fell WIder some
Lmivenal category rep resenting thei r sha.r~ci q \lality. Here in its conter:npo' .-l.ry
form the problem :is rnanif~t<:::d in lilt u ual deJlland that discourses be dissim ilar
in nature, yet also share a common, motivating moment {that there is no metadiscourse submming the m, the prqject of esse.nriaJist mod~rnNm}. The plurality
sldt: of there bein g dive.rse discourscs is self-t:\i.UtI1l, Lul perhaps it seems odd to
say that different discourses must share a u nity in something's non-existence or
in the absence of a meta-digcourse. To say, however> thal difftreJ\( di.~(:oIJr ~f. s an~
e;'H:h dissfwiall':d rl"llTTl fI. ~iflglc cxx~n.Lial.ist language is to l"Ilake UIlC impurlaul
da.i.m abouL tlle origills and n ature of each, It is to 3ay that each possesses a
specificity or particularity that derives from their like resistance t1) translatiull
WlO one gnn~T~l laHg ll<tgl;". (lr logic:. Rllt thr.1l it i!li one general language that
define~ them all, if only ill a m :gativc ~cn.'Ic. The di1emma at hand, th en,
concerns the nnpLications of emph<lslzing eith l:': r th~ p lurality or the. unity side.s of
postmodernis111 '5 combil1ll1.g a defeme uf d.ivcl"~i.ty <\nd a 1l111t.uaJ dt'lr.andng from
moderrust essentialism.
Of course ail d.iLernroas are dispellable to the extent that one ;~ ".,.illing t.o
r. mhrar:~ th~ mnse qu~nc~.'i of taking one h orn or the other of 1111:: llile;:IIUll ii. roc
fJOs lmociernists,l suggest., the p roCCs."l of futurc adjustment >vil.I req uire becoming
clearer about the idea that discourses appear non.communicatin g. Sa}'wg: ili<tt
different discourses are not hadcerl hy a r.omrnon meta-<liscourse make;
discourses out lu be uon·wuunullit..:aling- ill only one specific. scnsc. Are there,
then, other fonn~ of linkage or corrununicatlou between discourses compatible
with thi~? And might these other [onus ul liuk<1.gf.: or r:omnmnir:.atinn preserve
both the specificity of different discourses :in It:l"Im:i uf" lhei1" separate conditions
of production and yet still support a critique of essentialist modernism ? S:lmlleli>
wrmlrl allow th at th~re an~ indeed forms of comm~uricaliun bt:!wl;c.I.I Ji .R;IJ~H·~
(I(her [han just th r. shan,:n n-jc:c:tion of a single meta-discourse, since h e does not
embrace the conclusion of the reconstructed argument above that radical noncommunication is a necessary implir:atio n of discourses h aving dive rse
conditions uf Vl"Oduc..:tion. In sayil.lg how eke discourses ·c.ommunieatc1 then, we
mi,~ht attempt to resolve the dilemma above by sho..,..,ing that there are linkages
hNwf:f:n dif',tinr.t ciij;f,()ur:-eR that do not imply essentiali~t f:::J.t.p.gori~s.
NOLe lllat an alternative resolution of Ult: dilemma. hert wuuld be simply to
embrace non-communication in a radical fashion> thereby glyjng up the search
for a form of co mmunication between discourses <Lnd also a sharw c.:ri liq ut:! ur
IfII) d f:rn is.t. mda-clisC":Ol II'l'W_ In !:fi'cct, mOdCl"lltsnl would be defeated simply by lht:
practice of individuals always operating in terms of self-contained discourses,
rarher than by argument Thi ~ n ihil i!\t solution, h owever, seems an undeslrdble
way of dispelling tho:.~ d,ilcmma r:.1.~:.I !1g jll"lst lllodc:rnism, chiefly because an articu late critique of modernist essentialism is pTellumably important to the defense o[
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diversity. But before developing this conclusion in the last section b e1ow/ attention
ought fir.<:t hI': givf':n In how ir: might. hI". t.hnllgh l. that. the dilemma set forth ai"xm:
ha~ come: ahnlJl. hi s r J:)J"it~ally with llw f:1llf: r-gr:: n c;e.: (lr p(J~lmlJderIliSIll.
My thesis here is that the dilenuna iacj n~ postmodernism has its origins in the
way in which po!)tJT)oderni@ll historically developed as a critique of moclr.rni!'\m.
SUPPO::H:: - lu tell a : i liglltly apucryphal ::ilury - that scholars struggled for m.a n)'
years with the classic, m od ernist corresp ondence problem regarding h ow our
representations of the world relate to the v/Odd . These scholars' difficulty tor
many years was that they believed there to be one underlying: n-.dli l>·, tIl( lu g·h ' I.IIt')'
io und th emselvc~ committed to competing and often incommensurate ways of
representing that reaJ.it}~ Finally after many years of frustratio n and fruitless
debate over who~c rcprc~cntation of rc:ality ~ras C'o rl"l':ct, snrnF. :;;clll:ll ar':i- "::;,~CI"led
that the idea of a. single, independent underlying reality must itself be contradictory, because - reasonably enough - the idea o( a single reality is itself a
d i~urs iVf: itr.ln, and all di~r; UI-:)i",'e: j (C::HI~ f.ll.l::i.~r:.S~ mulLiple senses. There only (":xi~t.
- these P08Ln:oui::m il> U lh<:: n argueu - ui.fn~ rt: Ul diocourst!s,-or. d ifferent modes of
representation. But now the dilemma eme.rp;es. T hat it was originally thought
lhal th t'l"t' nist gemu.ndy distinct, alternative: discourses depende d on lht: itlt".a
that> were there a sinp;le: un ique underlying reality:. thcn there had to be a single.
unique mode of representation of that reality. That is, the idea of the distinctness Df a cliscow'M: was l'o[)Led in llie iuea. of ils pussiliit': IJfliq\Jt-:n~ss ;t:-; thf:'" only
correct representation of a 31ng1c rcality. Yct if w e now say that no w lg'h;, LlmlerJying reality exists, then the past basis for saying that discourses are genuinely
d ixl.ilU:1. ami d ifft'.Tt'.1It from ont"o;.m otht'.r h ;.t~ bl;'f;'.n rem oved. M oreover, unless new
criteria lor exvlailling' llic iura or i.li:sliJl(;Ults:; a.nd dilferem:e are d eveloped, it
canno t be ruled out that discourses are more alike than different from onc
<iIlllthcl" - a <.b·dopmt:nt whidl might irollic.:ally then r:ni":ouragr: nt":(JJn(,df'.rnisls
lo argue that "different " discourses tend to, say, "converge» on d . . c ~!corrcct"
representation of a singk> lmderlyin,~ reality.2
On this vie\v, much C"ufl"tnt posLlllodeJ'I:llSm pn"_,\t:rvt:s, if ill a l:-l t.t:IlL 'If implicit
manner, an important presupposition of moo c:m i.":m in that. pn.": J.Il1 !)d f':r l ( j.~IT"~
concept of dilterence as unlqueness is an inadvertent inheritance from
1rI(I( l f~ Tlli s rrl. lJlli f JlI t! n ~s.'\, it s~~ms ra ir t.o SiiY> i') ;.In essentialist notion in that it
depends on lhe idea of a ~i.IJgle COlTt$!JoJlue;:m .:t; lu a :si.ngle: reality, To say something is unjque i.nvolves making a complete and comprehensive survey of the
world, in order LO say that one and one thing only occupir:s a t"":t':"rta.in pl:'J.c:f'" in
that ",,"orld, nut postmodernists need not explain differel1ce in term s of the Idea.
of uniqueness. T h ere are other ways of explaining- thc concept of diflerc nce that
postlnonl":"rnism mig ht.li.dnpt - way!'\ whit~h w ~ \v(II Jld hope would HlHkt speaking
about differcnec compatihle with. jointly dr.Jlying a .'lingle mc:ta-rfis(,;OI ll'."f': f'::<i.<;ls,
sustain the critique of modernism, and thus serve to dispel the dilenuna abov\.':.
\'\'hal. this s lJgg(>;.<;.t~ is t.ha t. for prn;t.moof':rnist t.hinking to be sl.IccessfiJJ it needs to
hI': dahol"atf:d indt':l~ ndl':"lly or thili. r:r ;tiflll ~ or ltll)r.lr:nl;:5H.1. tlml ~p("t.:i!kally tn.·a ls
discourses as self-con tained and non-communicating. "\Vhat ia rather needed,
more specjficall)~ is an account of discourses' relative autonomy from om:
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another, ,~ ince an acc:mmt nf this sort would presumably make a discourse s
lli::;lim.: lues:; a function of its laleral jIlXI<lJ.1~l$iti.on to oth~r dhcourses, rather than
a fun ction of its possession of the e~<:.entia1 i s t property of uniquene::.s. I now turn
tu lim... such an account might hP. ~ttempted .

Identity conditions for discourses
If essentialist reasoning tries to explain r epresentation in terms of correspon·
dence to something 111':'YOI)(\ l'I': prt:: ~r:. I1If\liou. !lull-essentialist rea:;oning strives to
remain "i.t.h.in the ambit of Tcprrst:ntatlon, that -is} it strives to account lo r
tlistim.:t forms of represental.ion ill t~nn s of the whole. of representation or in a.
holistic manner. Thi-l involves explaining' the relative autonomy of diflCrcnt
discourses by referenr:r: to r.he principles that accomlt for the houndarir:!\ hr.twcc: n
discomses l where focusing' UIJ llle dividing lines bern'een different rusco urs("!s
makes thr.ir di!:r:inc:tness a ftmction of their relation to one another. Holistic
reasoning. that is, opt.:ratcs in term s of concrete wholes whosf: palTI are from fJh':
outset the (internai) determinations of those ,",,"holes. /\ concept of dillcrcnec
dcvdopr.rl along flw"~~ liur.::s dues not tradC': in thl': f:onf: r:pt (lr IJn;qJIt":Jl e:'S ~ , :s.i..t ll: t:
the whole's parts .- here different discourses are different from one another as
r",.lat:e.d pa.rt )!. ()r une whole - or of discourse generally. Dillerence is understood
immanently, as it were, ra ther than absolutely.
H ow specilicaJl); then, should the boundaries between discourses Ix: conceptualized? \V11ell we:: !ipeak of boundaries beLweeH things WI-: ~1Jppmif': w t:. are
f:lmlllm,n eotlsly concerned \o\.;th those boundaries and the distinct and -identiliable
thiHgS l.iJOSI": bOlln daries permit us to distinglli!\h. Fllrth er, to say that one has
some clistinct and identifIable item is to say lhal um; oou)d clalxrrat~ identity
c:onditions for that item whic:h 'ioIIllllld allow U'l to distinguish and reidentify that
tlii ng in a vt.l.Tiety of senings and through r.hangr. ill lil t: wtly we taJk a.Luu( thing'!'.
Identity conditions, that is, are criteria used for singling out, identifying, and relabeling l!Jjug~ we want tD pay f:p~d ~ 1 <1llculiull to, and rdlect the implicit
ontologies of the 1a.n~age wc cmploy. To say that there are identity conditions
fur discomscs, then, is to :lay lllaJ. th l": n~ ar~ criteria for singling out, identifyi ng,
and relabeling different discourses. T h e business of doing this, moreovcr, both
establishes the bO\lndari ~~ ht':twr:en di~co urse~ ffild determines thc relative
autonomy or identity tilaLc..Iilli::n::nl ili:;cuunes may be said to possess.
or COUr!le. t.rylng to say what makes one discourse distinct from another is a
herculean task, sine!":, ill C:Olltn L"t. to tangible. things such as a t.a ble wh~f': vlslUil
outline and tactile q ualities offer us obvious starting points, discoUl''Scs are
changing (".ol1 (':c: t.ion~ (lr rdatively elusive (:onc:c:ptual m ovf':~ and practices that
may w ell scem to lack any apparent identity 'Nhatsoc\'cr:~ Nr:mr:thr:lr:sf:, T slIggc:.::.i
tllM t.hf. rf':l;.'J.(ivt: aulonumy ()r identity of dio;col..U":'les b~ llnrl f! r~tooc1 in terms of
the fu nctional roles played u>· lwo different types of copcepts o{X:raliBg in allY
giv-en disc:our!w., where rhese two t)"lJes of conccpr.s are distingu ished according to
thc contdbutiom they make to a cfucow-se's wlily amI di sl. illC : IJ w_~ r~l)pf:':ctivdy.
Firn!'., ('very di5COlrrse possesses concepts and notions which we may i.4{re~ are
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cUllral tU or consrirutive of that discourse. Like core concepts in Ltkatn!:i<1.11
research programs, these concepts an d notions may be thought key to that
rlisr.o n ,. ~'s uni(y (\ !i all i<.k:ulifiabk o:.~ oun:~ in the sellse uf being llDlqur. to th"il.t.
discourse. Second, every discourse also pos~esses concepts and notions which,
Ihc,ug·l I II Oll;UllslituLiv~ of its unity or specific to that d isoo\tr':ie, nonethe1es~ play
a role in that discourse, Unlike in the k"1.katosian con ception, thcse lattel; noncom;litllt,ive concep~ may be reg·arded as boundary-lllarkr.T!i, sinef: thf:)' 8.l'r hot,h
louuc..l ill uLlier J~CUlln;~ and yet still playa role in the discourse under considerMion. As opposed to explaining the unity of a discourse, thcsc latter eoncr.pl:s
lIIay he lUlderstood as Uleans by ",,'hich we establiSh the distuu :lll!"::C;x til' a given
di~oour:.e. In effect, the), enable us to pick out just wh ere tJlt~ d:iscoursc in qucstion cO,mes into contact "",ith other discourse~ .
BULh kinds of concepts, then, are necessary to cxplaining the relative
autonomy or identity of a discourse in terms of its unity and distinctiveness ii."om
other discourses. An example m ay help elarify this conception. Tn pns.t.-K ~ynf.$i"'H
discourse the notion of true uncertainty is reg-drded as a constitutive element in
~f..J.uilibriwll tulell1.ploymem arguments. In neoelassical-s>'ntht:sis K"lm:xi;.JTI
discourse the notion of ri.gid wages L': regarded as a constitu tive dement in equilibrium une rnployrnentargum~nts. Each conC:f:pt, thm , r.nntrihllt.p.~ to Ihp. IInity of
these two Keyncsian di ~cOll rW!i. 1n contrast, the concept of au um: lllploymt:. nl
equilibrium, though it i ~ e:mployp.d in hoth poot-Keyne.c;.i<lo and neoclassicaJsynthesis Keynesiao. discouJ"st, is oon:sululivt: uf tht; ullily of neither argument
As a concept, it thus contributes to our picking· out the boundary between the
two klTlliS of argunH':n t. Til dfFrl:, if' ~ rlilTF.rF.1l1 ial riH.lly)pria.tiun iu. lhc. two
discourses tclh us where the two discour::;cs both eomc into c.ontact and yet
rf':main di.~ l iJld.
Som e, perhaps, will think this conception of a discourse with t.w o different
types of concepts cumbersome and l.mnecessary to explaining the relati.v~
autonomy or iuenli ly uf Jiscount:~. 'rV'by HoI simply explain what makes
discourses cfutinct and dille rent in terms of their constitutive notions alond Tilc
11Il lhh~ 1 1I wi'- h pnu:....edillg in this mannt;:r is that it l{'.avc~ us with postmoderni'ml':':
apples and oran~e s, non-communication problem. If a discourse's constitut ive
wncepts are spedfic to that discOtrrse alone, then in attr.nciing ~ol d y 1:0 thf' m we
lack u way of relating discourses to one another. H owever, in differcn tiating
bet\'\'een a SIngle discourse's constitutive and non-cons.titutive concepts we put
ourselves in a position to explain that di~r.oUl"3 C '!\ -identity !ipr:r.ific.ally a~ a ff':l<l fh:e
autonomy, o r as an autonomy relative to other discow'SCs. 'lbe key to this
(:{)Ucepcion, it should now be apparent, is in being able l(l:'lay thai. hUlll I.YJl(~ or
concepts must operate in any given discourse. N ot just a diseourse:s constitutive
concepts, but also its assoc.iated penumbra of non-mmtitl.1 t.ivp. c()nc:~prs must: be
sccn as nccessary to the understanding of that discourse.
O f r:nm!w., s::lying 1.hal: n nn-c.on ~tiT.llti ve con cepts are as necessary to a
discotU'Sc as afC it:l cOnStilu!.iv{: f:OIlt:t:JlL'I ~Ollll(l'i. Deltl, h ul II ...." i.;; :iJl entirely
reasonable view to adopt if discourse is understood holistically. Then, though
c.omt.inltivr: c.onr:{'pto; ill'l"; r.pl";l~i fi{'. to indivi(] Jm.l di.~(!)~u ·:sr.:~) lhey ~(ill w!t:d to bt
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umlcrSlUOU as operating in 00l1jUfl t;liuu wilh a furth er appanltus of concepts th at
are not specific to that discourse. Holistic reasoning generally operates with
complex wholes which may not be ~muku wilhu u( ut.:slroyiug lhe whole,
and wi. it:h a lso :1t:(:()mm odate differenr. fim ctio ns for different r.lemen t<: in those

is inherenl in the wHivoitiauly CUIu:reltc n;laliomhips obtaining beh . . . een
f:c.o nomists" (Davis ) 990: 33). One reason to think this is that there is growing
c,\';dcnec that econ omic agents are not appropriately all modeled as individual,
consrrau'led optilllizCl'N ead l overating williill a gr.ut:.ra l r.Q ll lli hrillm. Thus

whoJf'~I;;. H ere: 11 lS suggested that constitutive n otions aCC01lllt Jor discW'Sivc unity

psychologists haw: argut:d that human dt:cision making ofifm no~!\ not satisfy the
axiomatic requirements of neoclassical theory (cf Thalcr L992). c lhit:isLs have
;jrgueo (hat individuals in markets often aet from non-!::eJf-regarding, non-ut.iJityenhancing) altruistic motives ~e.g.) Sen HJ~ 7)j feminists have argued that power
and p atriarchy socialty detennine the actions of ". . omen and mcn (perber and
Nel~oT1 1993}) and a range of heterodox economists see class, corporate power,
cu lture, social values., and a variety of other explanation:; of beh avior as being
celltrally invotveu ill markets. Nom:: or lht:st::: lypt::s uf cxplanations are neatly
suited to produ cing a modernist determinacy in Lhe analysis of exchange in
markets. 'l'his strongly suggests that there arc good rC::U:;OIlS to Ldit:vc lhu.l market
participants do Ilol ~ l la.n~ in a slngle hig-lu:r logic ill 1.l1t: il' !'r:specliv~ in t.f':riu:tioos
with one another, and that we acoordingly ought to attend_more carefully to
different and changing forms of behavior in market activity. nut if thi s is the
case, then modeling d.i ~cursive interaction a.~ marht r:xchangf. 1n t~rm.<; of Ii
formal synuneo-y of behaviors explicable in terms of a single mathematics is
euLirely misguided. Rather, ......e should seek to explain the changing and often
incompatible means by which very different dis(;UISive agents negotiate
exchangC$ WiUl om; anulher wililuut :; ujJpo~il1g that a dettrrminate formal apparalU:i Li~s ht:hind ti lt-: I ] IfIcwtt' p llt'J lulIlt'Tla.
Hd orf': r:omlrlf':ring how to go aocmt. thls, howeverJ we should note one very
tangible advantage to U3ing concepts of market exchange to model tli~t:UllljVt:
interaction. Saying that inoivirllla.ls ann rli !':C':Ollr.~f.~ intera ct v-ith one another
much in thc way tllat market paItieipants engage in cxchang-e .implies. that
somehow discourses do succeed in comnmnieating despite their (JrigirlS ill vr:ry
different conditions of production. Indeed, this eondusion i.'l only reininrr:f.d
shuuLd we agree that) contrary to much traditional thinking in ncoclassical
t:con om ics, th~re is no single meta-logic underlying real-world ~ark.et eXfbangf:.
T hen the fa ct thAt exchange does occur tells us that economic aF{ents' particularity is compatible with their dllicun;lve luleml(iuH. TIlt:: lask UII:ll ooIlfi:onts us,
the.n , 1!': to explajn jus.t how discursive particuhuity is compatible 1,4,rith discursive
intcraction understood as a kind of trade. An example applying the discoun;e
analysis developed .in the lasl section is sugga;tivc.
Consider hOU!'ir".hoLd r-,Xc-l Iangf: lli!twr:e:n womf:n and m~n in ahll!uve nome')tic
violence relationships where trade is treated as 3. form of discurs ivl.: iuh:racliul1 .
On the vie w above, constirutive and non-r.onstitutive r:onr:r.pr.'\ charac.r.e.rizp. thf':
respective discourses. of women and men. How m ay wc undcrstand domestic
violence in marriages involving production sp ecialization and exch ange ill terms
of these two kinds of concepts? Farmer and Tiefr.nthalC":r (19Y7) f'.xplain
domestic violence In non-cooperative relationships where men derive u tility from

and nOll-comililuLiY~ notions point to discur sive boundaries that together cxpl~
the rdative autonomy or identity of discomses.
Docs th.is conception, then, help us addTess the non-conununication cWcmma
advanced above? The foUowillg ~ecljoll allcrnpts to answer thi::; question in a
positive way by considering a rather different set of ~'Tounds for operating in
terrns of the approach outlined. it has been ::;uggc::sleJ. fur txa.rnpl~ by Deirdre
j\'kClulikey (1994)J that cliscoufse~ and those who ll Sf: l:h l':rTI r:omm llnic.(l.te much
in the way that economic actors interact in market::;, and comcq ucntly that we
can dcydup an understanding of di.::;cur.siw: intr:rar.tirm or how di sc.nlln:\e.~
cCJ[]IIt1IJl1iC:(lI.~ ;Tl terms of a mood of marke.t. pxrha.mre.. \¥('; t.hllS hlrn to the
market exchange model of discursive interaction in an ~£fort to dctcrmine what
more we might learn abouL wHufl Ulllcation from this perspective.

Market exchange and discursive interaction
1\,{arkets typically involvt<! ne.cf!ntra1i7.ed exch ange beh·....een economic agents
spel:ialized in different types ()f pn....-lu c:tion wirhin ~Il overall d,v~ioJl Qf l~bor.
N/:'.or;la!3slcaJ econ omic the.ory gif.nf!rally gives the idea of exchange a decidedly
modernist interpretation by representing economic agents as atomistic individ,
uats, each will i th eir uvm wd1-ddined endowmenls amI axlOlfialically dl~~CTit}f-';(!
preferences, whose exchange "villi one another generates gains from trade for
each; a.:. if lhruugh the mechanism of an invisible h and. Tak..iug Ll I ~ a.s a rnmld
for th:: illtt: ral :l.iuli of different discourses, a neodas.<;ic:ist might th en ~my that
though inn ivirl1l aJ discoune producers eaeh have their own linguistic cndowments and conccptual preferelK.t':3, llleir mSl:univc; trade and interaction with
one anOilif:f ref1f':C': t ~ an llnderlying logic or meta-discourse that to neoclassical
economists worb much like how universal constrained optinlization results in a
general equilibrium between imlcpcIlIleul producers. Just as, that is, seemingly"
veey different economic agents' trade with one another reflects one, underlying
meta-discourse of bade that may be e<ljJluroo in sels of ~q uations whose joint
w lutiun can be proven to exl!'it, :10 that rl i sc.oll t'!'i~ and their producers generally;
on the tTaditional neoclassicaJ model of market exchange, preswnably 5hare a
couunOJl meta-language or deep grammar that makcs conuuunlcalio ll p~ilJlt: .
Thf'.re :tre ways, bmvever, to repre.sf:nt markf:t e.xr:h:m ge as a model Jor discursive interaction that bypass the modcrni3t :features of thc neoclassical accouu L

Distinguish.ing bt:l WCCll ~{e thodolog}' and methodology a~ d(l~ 1vk Ooskr.y
( IQQ4), ". . .e 1T.1ight say that di!i(;unJive trade and interaction a.re not guidf: rI hy;m
underlying logic or 11lda-ui~t:ount: but rather by multiple, evolving llonn.s of
eonvc:rsatiOll. IIT11t:n: is
no "Methodology of economics ... only sllstaim:ci
verbal and "vrittr.n intcm.f'.tion which defies ab-stract characterization, because it

violtll<':c agaiu.s LWOIlleIl, amI WOfIH::ll uerive uliliLy liurn n:al income received in

exchange. \'Vhile the Farmer-Tie±enthaler analysis expbins the behavior of both
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women and men formally in terms of a single mathematics of con.s trained
oplimh:alioll) we may d~Jlart from and reinterpret their l..ltility analysis to dilJerentiate two distinct discourSe3 in L~c dillen:lIl arguments of women alii ) men's
n::spct:tiv~ utility functions. Only men, not women, derive utility hUIll viokuu:
pc::rpetrated a gaills l women. Thus WP. may say that constitutive of the discourse
o f m e n engaged in spousal abuse .is a :;d . of conccpls Lhat Iic sl"';l f-t:'$(e('.m to
spousa l abuse. In contrast, women may be said to understa nd lheir :>LaLUK as a
product of paJ ri;t n:h),. Th~ c:onct:pt of patriarchy is constitutive of their
discourse. Thus though formally each may be .~a.ici to haVf': ul ility fUIlctiom, a
morl!': r.on rrete an.:llysis of their preferences gives us a b as,U; fur :m ying that they
r.ar.h 111i . . .<;t':~.~ <t oore of 8pecilic t:OrH:epts '(hat make thf.ir di ~('.ourses hig-hly incomm ensurate with one another.

At the same time, howev'er, there arc non-constitutive concepts in the
ruSt:UltrSC of each which 'l.\"'e specific to nelther discourse, but which work

togeth er with each one's constitutive concepls. Here 1-ve may i't ft:J' to n,mcepts
which each possesses that concern such things as the value of fa mily :t.r lf.l hum!;,
the:: imporlaJ Jct: of j oim incoml.':, f:ultural e.xpectatio ns about married life, desire
for c.om panionswf,), and so on.'! A'S [lUI1-{.Qnstimtive, lhi~ h!.lj:~r set of ronef:ptc;
operates dillet'endy for women a n d men according to how the)' 'l::-Sptx..1 ivdy integrate tht:JlI l('\gcl.lier with (hust: concepts constitutive of the ir two respective
discourses. Thus womcn may understand the Me.riru;t::) lo abu:>t': th~y flla.kC
r~r~onany for family and children as part and pa.n.:d of living in a pall'ian:fl:i.1
~(I(:ir.:ly. Alte mativd):, a l.1lIsive and violent me.n may see family and children as
further aspe cts of th eir OWII sdf-magnifi("a(.ifJU. Eacll f:on.~q1J C':ntly sh.,·lres a set of
(n on -constitutive) concepts, but those concepts function dilferc:ntly for each in
lWo disunc l tiisCi mrses. Thus thr:ir tWD discourses are relatively autonomous and
identi£ab1c by having both a dhLiuli core of concept<; am i hy sharing conrf:pt.~
tha t mark ou t the points of contact or boundaric.", y,.;th fin \,,: ;1. rlolh(;~I:
Th !": F'rl.rmer-Tief\":nt.haler analysis also explains the breakdown of abusivc
l'c1ationship~ and the terwillation of exchang~ hetween !.he women and men
involved in rJle m in terms of a thres.hold or threalvuiul at which WDilleJl c~a~·a·: to
ao.:,r.:p l the l11:'lrr'j;:!.ges combination of real-income Lransfe rs a nd spousal abuse.
III uur framc-.voI'k, lfJ e respective di!':cnlJr~~ of women ano mf:n cease to communic.a te. Wc m ight say, ming the .liar·lIlt:J,-Tiefe::nthalcr crll!lha).,j~ on women's
shdtt':r~ alld Sl'pport nctworkc; a.~ a form of real incom c, that in these eircumstancc~ wOOlt:n':-; diswur!'l~ drl)p~ (hose Df}n~nnstlnl1ive concepts shan~rl w il.h
m en regardin~ fa mily and home. and adds ncw nf1n-c.o n~1 il.U l.i.vt~ coIK:(':pn shan:::u
willi (I,l lt!r abuse victims regarding personal security and non-p atriarchal family
hfr.. On lht: assumption LJlal. I:c.)~, constitutive c.onCt":pts nil! h elp loc:aJ.c: ditfc rent
discourses specitic to different groups o f \",'om e. n if I shdter and SUpp nl1. Il d w(,rlt"s ,
!'l::t ~ conceptc; re:gardlng class, education, and so cial advantagcs t then discursive
iulcracoon J'eeJI Jt-;rg[·~ wh en diffen:nt ,"vomen's discourses diHerenLly integrate
their r esp cctive core, constitutive conceyb \....itL their shat·t d, IltlTl-(omtitutive
":DnCf':pt~) which mark out points of eontacl and boundarics betvveen relatively
autollt'JLlHltlS lli!'coul"ses withi n ~l)tlter and support n envorks.
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Using a markr.t modd of d:isCOllTl!C, tlu.!.Il, J i!;;l:w·si\·e:: im eraeLlol1, like:: tt.:Ollomic
excha n ge) is periodic, interrupted, and shifting-. Indeed, we may further oomp1irare th e pic:hlTI; a:hovt: in two ways. First, on <l posCIDodem view of di.scourse as a
form of exchange. discursive parties presuma bly (Tilde al w allY .sites: ill the
process simultancously reconstituting themselves in a varie ty of wa ys as they
integ'rate "II,ltiplt $el s nf >;haJ\':d, n(IIH-:on5htutivt': (",()n(",~p ts '\o\.J.th their constirutive
Ul Jt:,s. Se::cum], Jlothing ill t11t: analy~is he re requjres that oore -consrituti\,(:
concepts be unch anging. '10 the extent thal w e a rc successful in characteri zin~
LUIlccpts specific to ~ discourse: c..:uIJ~L il.l lliVf: (~ nJlr.C': pl·~ p(, s~e s~ a d"'gr~ of
'Slauili Ly. But clt:arly UII lite exeha.nge model of dis(;ursWc interaction the abundance of contacts between discourses argucs for ch ange in core, constitutive
concepts. Of course discomse.s also die (lml art'; llf)rtl . Wit ho ut, (JJ . I.t~rnpllTlg to say
hm.... changing interaction Lelwt:eH J.i::;cuur~CJ in. tenllS of non-constilutive
concepts impacts on core concepts) we may simply say that the continual resitingof di~ruJ'!':ivt" int1":ranion mntributf:s to the elimination, crealion, and transformalion of discourses.
Thus thc re is considerable lUldecidability and indete rminacy in the framework. developed here to explain tbe relative. a.u t.o nom y and identity of disc.o IJTsa.
Yt"t Ihis 1J1H 1 ~ci cl;{hilil y :iflll iHdl~ l.t:rlll i mu;y lltjther QVe.rttu'ns that framework, n or
leaves U8 with the non-c.ommunication diJcmma :set out abovc. Discourses do
cOirun unica tc with one a nmher without rec:UlU"SI! lu a sillglt lJI tt 't-dj~wu l "St (;.tS
individuals may interact in markets w:i(hont ;1 TI~lIdax." il ..,.. 1 ~ 1I · rnal i s.rn) , a wl yel.
d iscourses may still be understood in terms of their distinct conditions of
pmrlu('; tio n. D ocs this fram~work,. then, offer solid grounds. fo r su staining the
[11:):'; lm ~"rl~nl r.J'itiq1J1': of c:s.<;e:nriali<;m~ The al1~n'Vt'I" to
quc:slioH (.;au ptrliaJ.>:)
b cst b c given by comparing nihilism and relativi3T11.

uus

NihillSJD, relativislD., and the politics of
postrnoderni!'ill'l.

'''''hat is nihilism? In their reccnt clisClls~ion of

K~yTlt!"', JrI.( :k Armuiglin am] DavLd
Ruccio (19Y5} take Kr..YllCS' late emphasis on animal spirits a nd lU1ce:rtainty as an
impenetrable ba rrier to calculative rationality, and thus as a n important postmode rn C': 1f'.ln l': J1 1 in Kf'.vJ1l':s' t.hinking that helped inlroduce ind eterminacy and
undt:d dauili ty iJJlO conlempo.rary economic discoUJ1)c. Thcy sec thls as p art of
"a progrfOssive slide into nihili'im" on KC.)11~~ ' part., hut argue th a t Kt:yn~ should
be prL-lised r~theT lhan UlI1cle.nlllnl fur il.. a (;eJ1t':ral ly, th!".n, nihili~rn for Amafigiio
and Ruccio and many postmoderrllils is the view th a.t discoursc is always incomplete: fr agme n ted, a nd laden with indeterminacy. Em br(l cil.1g nihi lism thll.<:
means rejecting the modcrnis( prac tice (If Irie r<lfchically pri\.ilt!g·illg- t1Ll.lt:,· (IV!":'·
H
cli~ ol'(kr, and rceogllizing thatattcmpt:i to "domesticate Wlcertainty are ultimatdy
doom cd to taiJ (also d Amariglio and R uccio 1994).
Thi s. vi~w would ~e.C':m to imply that the discursive world cannot be made up
of uilrt:.r~nl, I'tla.Lively self-contained discourses, si.n ce to suppose dill would be to
'Posit some dcgree of order over thc disord.er. \'Vhlle Am a riglio and Rnccio, as
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weD as other postmodernists \,!ho have voritten on nihilism, are more disposed
Lowa.nJ llt~ idt:i:I or di;Jlog bety./een d istinct. relatively self-contained discourses
than the characterization of nihilism here would seem to suggest (cf. Amariglio)
Resnick, and WoUf 1990; Rm;{;iu 1991), it is no netheless insmu.:thre to consider
the consequences of nih.ilism lor the dilemma set forth in this chapter. Thus,
were uncertainty and lUldeci.J~biI ity pcrvasM:, it \oVOukl. fullow lila !. t.:ullJmunit:atio n ann sharr.n understanding bern"een different postmodernist cUscourses
would Hot obtain. In the: thi nking rl(".'{r:' op~~1 ;.tbovJ;., it wotd(1 not male liCIJ..~C III
say that th ~ c rl i !!C OlJrflf~ ~ h;).red a. set of non-.c.ons{ih.ltive concepTS pe.rtaining to a

shared critique of modcrui..:HIl. In c.:Ifccl, 011 a IW.I.i.!.i.sl view diversity swamps
common ground. But t hif. jars with t.hf' Povirlent mmmon grounl"l postmodernist
discourses sharc against mOdernl8-ill.
There is a related consequence of embracing pervasive indeterminacy and
undecidability. If disorder always conquers O1'del~ so tllat one can never hope tu
"dom~~~ticate" .~pherf:s of rliscour:;;;f':, thf':n ditlerence- dominates co herence absolutely. Radical uncertalllty understood in this wa)" then: inverts the completenes,;;
and fmality sought in modern ist rationality, :;;;;nce. it ~till daims that the.rr: is one,
single reality (charactcrjzcd now in terms of univcrsal frL\gmcntation and
()mnipresent disorder), and still propos~s to wo rk in rerms of a singlr. Ia.ngll ag~
(that of indeterminacy and undecidability}. Nihilism, as argucd abovc in COWICClion with the historical origins of the (':on(:t;pl of Jjnr..r~ll(;t: ill l",:-;tJIII HJt:nlism,
simpJy works in terms of an altcrnative set of absolu tc5. In cth:et, it opposes core
concepts of indeterminacy an d c:Ii sol,~r t.o mf,op.rnj~m 'l': (:nrl": .-,on('.1":111;<.; (,r dt:k r'minacy and order, but shares non-constitutive, boundary conccpts of a single
In.nguage and a single realit)~ Postmodnnism lInd~r!'-;t()()(j in th~~r: Ir.rms i ~ ;:) form
of discurslve interaction with modernism, rathcr than an internally differentiated wbole of posrrnodernist voices relatively autonomous c:hir.fly in r~pf.c:t to
one anoth er.
I lhink the latter form of postmodernism - tha.l is. ODe tltal di[fer~nLialc.s l'mLmodernist voices relative to one another rather than relative to modernism - is
lilt: I.lrd~lTl;d our~. And in place of nihilism, I also recommend postmodern.isb
adopt what was earlier labeled a principled rclativ-isID. On this conception particular diocourses possess tcmpofmy and rdativc st.ahility that. r:nahks th l":ir
r:ompilrative invest(g;a tion, though nothing in this :mg.~estg they can be arranged
ill ~JJy kind of hierarchical order. \Vha[ can instead be achk\lcd i~ a t:rtJ:-......discourse type of .investigation that bui1d<: an account of difle rr.na:~ hr:tween
cliscourst::s in lCfIrI:S of their differential appropriation (vi a their respective OOtlstitnrive concepts) of sbared non-constitulive concepts. Generali}) then,
conullUlUcatioJl js rclaLivc Lo the discuurse in wbich one operates, just as Samuels
argued. Rut our abiliry to explain the relative character of d iscourse turns on the
principles involved in reading itcross discourses here ticcl up with the treatment
of comhn It)ve ~nd non-constitutive concepts. Thus a principled rdativi~m offp.n
postmodcrnism a means of preserving an emphasis on undecidability and indcIt:l"mifl<lc}, wl1il~ tiho in!;uring a form of comrmmication belween differ~nt
poslmodcmlsL a.fJpruac1J,:.;~ .
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)J i hil j~m, in contrast, suffer.') at least n ....o importan t Vl.llnerabilities as a po~t
modernist a.pproach. In thc first placc, discursive exchange a.nd interaction
chiefly willi IfIOtlt:r ll i:-;1fI is u fll i k~I}' 1.0 .s~n.'t::1S lUI dTc:c: l.i \,l~ ( ;J"ili(IU ~ of modenIism,
since - on the model of discursive interaction adopted here - the core concepts
specific to mode.rnlsm are not lI() Lit~eab L )' a t ri&k wht:u 1Iihili.'i1U alii I IlIodt~ nl i sm
discwsively interact over shared commitment to a single (though dillerent :for
each) language and rcalit)o: No doubt com"inccd modenUsts, pe.rhaps IltoI I1UUernists, will say that gaps, discrepancies, undecidable momen ts, and so on are
.iust a part of an inC'_xorahlc progrt~~ toward knowlcdgr.. Tn th ~ ~r.r:onrl placf'..,
focusing on the rdatio mhip hr.hvf'.r.n postmodf;rni:'lm and mocierni~m rid,racts
£i-om attention to multiple interactions among multiple cl.i3C()W'SC~. BIll aLLl:tlLiuIl
to the latter is not only important for understandIDg the dynamics of discourses
- what might be thought the positive project in pO:JOTIodernism - but also for
simply demonstrating- that there exists no single, m eta-cliscourse.
Thill last po.int is a valuable onc to conclude upon. Onc dlll1cnslon of postmodernism t.hat especially desf:rves emphasi." i" th~ form - of its pnliticaJ
progress.ivenes~. \\'hile hj~torically Enlightenment modernism was politicall)T
progressive in defending rights of individu.als against theocratic power, today
poslmudernism is politically PTO.~essi.V'e i.n defending roJe.ranc.e and openness
<-Igain~t. modern bureaucratic rationality. fudeed, the defense of diversity and
pluralism appean to be me chief p ractica1 consequence of posbnodernist
<.fut;VltJ1it:. That probrram, in its many aspeclli and dimr.nsiol1s, sr.~ ms wdl scrveci
by exhibition and an alysis of the variety of fortrul of discourse and their modcs
of disC1lfSive iIlteraclion. The argument in this chapter attemp~ to map out
some of this dynamic.
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Notes
I lor economics, in porticuiar, see the col.lection of papers in Samuels (1990;-.
Hau ~ man 's (19Y~) treatment of economics as a n ine:o:act science might be Wlde:rstood
ill these l.el'lu.:s.
3 It is worth pOi..rl!.iu.~· out iliat l.here ate many i(t:lus just as atllOlV llO W> as dil"iCUUI"&;S ill
regard to identicy thai we customarily u\":al: a~ distinct and fcident.illaWe. Fluw till:
social world, for example, tlK:re are one's moral obligations, a Gel·tam group's employment prospects, the legal rights to those accused of crimes, jX>litical platforms,
t.u:;loruS, and so HO, Sttmingly in a li"ol alrn l:t-il ,,,,; thout limit. Inrleoo, most of t.he
"lhiugs" ...... t arc inlcrc.s1:t:u in suciallift: ]mvc Td lh cr intrdt:lablt: idt:nti.£y c:onrutiollS.
That we nonetheless deal with them regularly as distulC't and reidenti.£i.."1blc implies we
have coherent means of doing ·50.
4 NotE': th::l.t l'I ll t h ~e items m:.ly he fr:uneri in lltilily terms .
.'"i C:orlrlingtfln (19A2) initi::ltr.rl thiO nihili~m c:rit1 rr!l~ of Kc:ynr:~ ;;.nrl Sh:H.:kle, bllt spoke of
it pcjorativcl);:
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